

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

WINSTON NAJEE REED,

Plaintiff,

v.

TASHEENA COOKE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:24-cv-00383-ART-CSD

ORDER

Plaintiff Winston Najee Reed brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 7). On June 10, 2025, this Court ordered Reed to update his address by July 11, 2025. (ECF No. 10). That deadline expired without an updated address from Reed, and his mail from the Court is being returned as undeliverable. (See ECF No. 11).

I. DISCUSSION

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. *See Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. *See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217,

1 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th
2 Cir. 1987)).

3 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this
4 litigation and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of
5 dismissal of Reed's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also
6 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the
7 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or
8 prosecuting an action. See *Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir.
9 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
10 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.


11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic
12 alternatives can be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the
13 Court's need to consider dismissal. See *Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983,
14 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives *before*
15 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord
16 *Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
17 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted
18 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court's order as
19 satisfying this element[,]” *i.e.*, like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled
20 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by
21 *Yourish*). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before
22 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful
23 alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986).
24 Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court
25 and the defendants to send Reed case-related documents, filings, and orders,
26 the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But
27 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even
28 reach Reed is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and

1 further squander the Court's finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a
2 meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors
3 dismissal.

4 **II. CONCLUSION**

5 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that
6 they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is
7 dismissed without prejudice based on Reed's failure to file an updated address
8 in compliance with this Court's June 10, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court is
9 directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents
10 may be filed in this now-closed case. If Reed wishes to pursue his claims, he
11 must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current
12 address.

13
14 DATED: July 21, 2025

15
16
17 
18 _____
19 ANNE R. TRAUM
20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28